




EUI W orking Paper EC O  N o. 94/23
Short-Run and Long-Run Cournot 
Equilibria in Multiproduct Industries
Nkolaos Georgantzis





















































































































































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 94/23
Short-Run and Long-Run Cournot 
Equilibria in Multiproduct Industries
N ik o l a o s  G e o r g a n t z is
WP 3 3 0  
EUR




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Nikolaos Georgantzis 
Printed in Italy in June 1994 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































Short-Run and Long-Run Cournot 
Equilibria in Multiproduct Industries
Nikolaos Georgantzis* 




A number of multiproduct firms participate in the markets for two 
goods, competing to a number of single-product firms in each market. 
Although the joint production of cost substitutes is inefficient, partici­
pation in both markets yields, under a broad range of conditions, higher 
profits than participation in only one of them. Inefficient multiproduct 
firms may be contained in a long-run equilibrium configuration. If such 
configurations contain integer number of firms — instead of fractions of 
them — inefficient industry configurations are more likely to be sustained 
in the long run.
*An earlier version of this paper appeared as part of Chapter 4 in my Ph. D. thesis. I 
owe special thanks to professors Stephen Martin, Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz and Louis Phlips 
for their comments on that earlier version. Barbara Bonke and Aurora Garcia are gratefully 






















































































































































































In this paper I study the properties of equilibrium in a multiproduct industry 
which supplies the markets for two goods which are not related in demand.1 
The two goods may be complements or substitutes in production. Cost com­
plementarity and weak subadditivity of fixed costs of a multiproduct plant, as 
compared to the sum of fixed costs of the ‘stand alone ’ production of the two 
products, lead to global economies of scope. Cost substitutability and weak sub­
additivity of fixed costs of a multiproduct plant as compared to the sum of fixed 
costs of the ‘stand alone ’ production of the two products lead to local economies 
of scope. I study short-run equilibrium under the assumption that the industry 
consists of three types of firms: firms producing both products, firms producing 
only the first product and firms producing only the second product.
M ultiproduct firms possess the know how for the production of both 
products, while single product firms possess the know how for the production 
of only one of them. I assume that this asymmetry is a result of exogenous 
factors.2
Multiproduct firms may drop one of their products and become single­
product, if they find it profitable to do so. In my model, the decision of a 
multiproduct firm to become single-product is equivalent to the exit of a mul­
tiproduct firm followed by the entry of a single-product one. Therefore, mul­
tiproduct firms are treated as potentially multiproduct ones. This assumption 
corresponds to the first stage of a two-stage game in which potentially multi­
product firms first choose whether to enter as multiproduct or single-product 
ones and then make their quantity-setting decision.3
While multiproduct firms are implicitly allowed to choose between multi­
product and single-product activity, single-product firms are bound to produce
1The products are sold in two independent markets. The two markets are separate in the 
sense that the two goods are neither substitutes nor complements in consumer preferences.
2In the real world similar situations result from limited availability of licensing agreements 
concerning products whose production technology is protected by a patent which belongs to 
R&D-oriented firms. Kim, Roller and Tombak (1992) assume that two competitors have the 
possibility of choosing between two types of technologies. A flexible technology can be used 
in the production of both goods, while a dedicated technology can be used in the production 
of only one of the two goods. They show that in the presence of demand substitutability 
the two firms will choose the same type of technology. Therefore, a mixed industry structure 
(that is an industry in which multiproduct and single-product firms co-exist) cannot be an 
equilibrium under demand substitutability.




























































































only one of the two products. I assume that firms undertake production in a 
single plant.
In this analytical framework I reach the following main results:
In the presence of cost complementarity, a multiproduct firm contributes 
more to the total output of each of the two products than any of its single­
product rivals. In the presence of cost complementarity the opposite holds. If 
the two products are cost complements and the fixed costs of a multiproduct 
firm are equal to the sum of the fixed costs of ‘stand alone ’ production, the 
profits of a multiproduct firm from each product are higher than the profits of a 
single-product manufacturer of the same product. If the two products are cost 
substitutes, the opposite holds.
However, under a broad range of values of the parameters, the total profits 
of a multiproduct firm are higher than the profits of a single-product manufac­
turer of any type. When the fixed costs of joint production are lower than the 
sum of the fixed costs of ‘stand alone ’ production of the two goods, the range 
of conditions under which multiproduct activity is preferred to single-product 
activity becomes broader. This property of the short-run equilibrium and the 
assumption of limited production possibilities of single-product firms results 
in multiple long-run equilibria that contain multiproduct and single-product 
firms.
In Section 3, I extend the definition of the long-run equilibrium number 
of firms to its multiproduct analogous, the long-run equilibrium industry con­
figuration. Firms enter until the profits of each type of firm are driven to zero. 
I treat the integer problem in two ways. First, I allow for fractions of firms 
to enter into the industry. In general, the long-run equilibrium industry con­
figuration will exclusively contain either multiproduct or single-product firms. 
Multiple mixed equilibria require that economies or diseconomies of scope re­
flected in the fixed costs of production co-exist with diseconomies or economies 
of scope which affect unit costs of production. Under the assumption that in­
dustry configurations contain integer numbers of firms, there is a broader range 
of conditions that result in multiple mixed long-run equilibria. Inter-market 
mergers of single-product firms into multi-product plants lead from one long- 
run equilibrium configuration to another.
2 M ultiproduct Industry Structure and 
Short-R un  Equilibrium
A number of identical multiproduct firms compete with each other in a quantity­
setting fashion in the supply of two products. At the same time, they have a 




























































































2.1 T he m odel
In the market for product 1 the inverse demand function is given by
Pi =  a -  Qi (1)
and in the market for product 2 the inverse demand function is given by
P2 =  h — Q2 (2)
with a > 0 and h > 0. Qi and Q2 are the aggregate outputs of products 1 and 
2 supplied in these two markets respectively. Therefore,
Qi =  ^k=ixki +  £;A= i2/;i (3)
and
Qi =  £ k=\xki +  Em=i2/m2 (4)
where k is the number of multiproduct firms, A the number of single-product 
firms in market 1 and p the number of single-product firms in market 2. The 
multiproduct industry structure or industry configuration is then S  =  (k, \ ,p ) .  
Xk\ and Xk2 are quantities of products 1 and 2 produced by a multiproduct 
manufacturer k. The output of a single-product manufacturer l in market 1 is 
2/d and the output of a single-product manufacturer m in market 2 is j/m2.
For a single-product manufacturer l in market 1 costs of production are 
given by
Cn =  Pi +  biyn (5)
For a single-product manufacturer m in market 2 production costs are
Cm2 = P2 + b2Vm2 (6)
If the two products are produced jointly by a multiproduct manufacturer, 
production costs are given by
Cfci2 — Pl2 +  biXkl +  biXkl +  Clfi\JXk\Xk2 (7)
I assume that b\ > 0, b2 > 0, Pi > 0, P2 > 0, PJ2 > 0 and that Pi + P2 > 
Pi 2 denotes weak subadditivity of fixed costs of joint production as compared to 
the sum of the fixed costs of the ‘stand alone’ production of the two products.
Note that d2Cku/(dxkidxk2 ) = fil^ \fxk\xwi- Therefore, the sign of the 
parameter f3 determines whether the two products are cost complements (if 
/3 < 0) or cost substitutes (if (3 > 0). If (3 = 0 the marginal cost of each good is 




























































































as the degree of cost complementarity or substitutability. The multiproduct cost 
function (7) implies that costs are linear along a constant ray of production. 
Subadditivity of fixed costs of joint production together with cost complemen­
tarity lead to global economies of scope. Subadditivity of fixed costs and cost 
substitutability lead to local economies of scope.4
The profit of a multiproduct firm k is given by
b[k =  (a XkX )xkl
- f ( / l  E m -_ 1 Vm.2 X k 2 ) X k2
-biXki -  b2xk2 -  2/3y/xklxk2 -  Fx2 (8)
The profit of a single-product firm l which produces product 1 is given by 
If; =  (a -  T,k=xxkx -  T,j¥:iyj1 -  yn)yn -  bxylx -  Fx (9)
and the profit of a single-product firm m  which produces product 2 is given by 
if rfi =  {h ^ k=\Xk2 *̂ n̂ m2/n2 f/m2)f/m2 b‘2 Urn2 F2 (Id)
2.2 Equilibrium
I assume that a — bx = h  — b2 = M  which can be interpreted as equality between 
the sizes of the two markets.5 Firms set quantities to maximise their profits, 
taking their rivals’ outputs as given. Maximisation of the profit functions (8), 
(9) and (10) requires the solution of a system of (2k + A +  p) equations:
dY\.k/dxki = 0 =
M -  2xkx -  -  £jA=12/ii -  P\]xk2lx kx (11)
dX\k/d xk2 =  0 =
Ilf 2xk2 T,i^kXi2 Sm=12/m2 (d\Jxkx/  xk2 (12)
d\li/dylx =  0 = M -  2yn -  T,j^iyjx -  ££=1xfci (13)
dUm/dym2 =  0 = M -  2ym2 -  E„#myn2 -  E*=1xfc2 (14)
Due to non-linearity of the terms 0\Jxkx/x k2 and fi\Jxk2/x kx equations 
(11) and (12) are non-linear. I assume that multiproduct firms produce quan­
tities of the two products away from the axes and near the ray of production
4For a further discussion of the properties of the cost function (7) see Georgantzis (1992). 




























































































a?fci =  Xk2 - This assumption requires equal numbers of single-product firms in 
the two markets (A = p =  u). Such symmetric industry configurations can be 
described by S = (k, v), where v is the number of single-product firms in each 
market.6
Under the symmetry assumption, the interaction term becomes linear and 
is expressed in the reaction functions of multiproduct firms as a constant equal 
to (3. Multiproduct firms are identical. The same holds for single-product firms 
in the same market. I sum the reaction functions of identical firms in the same 
market. The system reduces to a system of two equations with two unknown 
variables, which correspond to the output of each type of firm in each market. 
Then, X\ =  x2 =  x gives the output of each multiproduct firm in each market 
1, and yi — V2 — y the output of each single-product firm in each market.
The system to be solved becomes
(  k + 1 v \  (  x \  _  f  M — 0 \
V « " + i j ' [ y ) ~ l  m  J
(15)
Solution of (15) gives equilibrium7 quantities. The output of a multiprod­
uct firm in each market is given by
M -  0(1 +  v)
X 1 + K + l/
The output of each single-product firm in each market is given by
M + 0K
y = 1 +  K +  l/
(16)
(17)
The industry structure S = (k, v) is non-trivial, if all firms in it have 
positive sales in the markets in which they participate. Prom equations (16), 
and (17) we see that this condition is satisfied for M /( 1 + v) > 0 > —M / k.
The total equilibrium quantity of each product is given by
Q — Q\ — <?2 —
M(k + v) — 0K
1 + K + V (18)
From equations (16) and (17) I obtain the following result:
6I assume symmetric industry configurations, in order to derive the analytical expressions 
of equilibrium strategies. Tables 1 and 2 provide the results of simulations with asymmetric 
industry configurations.
Equilibrium is locally strictly stable for all non negative n, and v. Under the same 
condition, stability of equilibrium in each market is independent of the equilibrium in the 




























































































Result 1 In the presence of cost substitutability (complementarity), the output 
of a multiproduct firm, in any of the two markets is lower (higher) than the 
output of a single-product firm in the same market.
From equation (18) I obtain:
Result 2 The total output of each of the two products is lower (higher) the 
higher the number of multiproduct firms and the higher the degree of cost sub­
stitutability (complementarity) between the two products.
The assumption of linear, downward-sloping demand functions implies 
that higher quantities lead to lower prices and a higher consumers’ surplus, 
while the deadweight welfare loss decreases. I consider the total output as a 
measure of social welfare. The implication of Results 1 and 2 is that, in the 
presence of cost complementarity (substitutability), a large (small) number of 
multiproduct firms leads to high (low) levels of social welfare. The effect of 
multiproduct technologies on welfare is greater, the greater the degree of cost 
complementarity or substitutability between the two products. Joint production 
of cost complements leads to high levels of efficiency and social welfare, whereas 
the opposite holds for joint production of cost substitutes.
Equilibrium profits of a single-product firm n are given by
In an industry whose structure is given by S = (k, u), the profits from 
multiproduct activity are superadditive with respect to the profits from single­
product activity if IR > 2IIn. From equations (19) and (20) we get the following 
proposition:
Proposition 1 In the presence of cost complementarity and weak subadditivity 
of fixed costs, the profits of a multiproduct firm are superadditive with lespect 
to the profits from multiproduct activity for all values of the parameter fi. In 
the absence of production relations between the two products the profits of a 
multiproduct firm are superadditive (weakly superadditive) if the fixed costs of
(19)
where i denotes the market in which the firm operates. 





























































































joint production are subadditive (weakly subadditive) with respect to the fixed 
costs of the ‘stand alone ’ production of the two products. In the presence of cost 
substitutability, there is a minimum level of subadditivity of fixed costs beyond 
which the profits of a multiproduct firm are superadditive with respect to the 
profits from single-product activity.
Proof: From equations (19) and (20) I get that FR > 11; + IIm holds if 
Fi + F2 -  F12 > PR.s=(k,v), where
R _  22M  + P(k - v -  1)
1 -f- K "j- V
Remember that M/(l  + is)} > (3 > —M / k is a necessary condition for the 
industry configuration S  =  (k, v) to be non trivial. Then the expression 2M  + 
/3(k — zy — 1) is positive. Remember also that the fixed costs of a multiproduct 
firm were assumed to be subadditive with respect to the fixed costs of the ‘stand 
alone’ production of the two goods. Therefore, F\+  F2 — F12 > 0. Then for all 
negative values of the parameter p  it is true that Fi +  F2 — F\2 > 0 > pRs=(K,„) ■
For P =  0 the profits of a multiproduct firm are superadditive as compared 
to the profits from single-product activity if F\ + F2 — F\2 > 0. If F\ + F2 = F\2 
then the profits of a multiproduct firm are equal to the sum of profits of two 
single-product firms, one from each market.
Finally, for P > 0, for each industry configuration S = (k, v) there is 
a minimum level of subadditivity of fixed costs, given by PRs=(k.,v) , for which 
a multiproduct firm earns more profits than the sum of profits of two of its 
single-product rivals (one in each market). □
The implication of proposition 1 is that the forces of the market reward 
efficient firms with higher profits in each one of the markets in which they 
participate. Profitability of multiproduct activity requires either cost comple­
mentarity or subadditivity of fixed costs. If multiproduct firms are free to 
choose between multiproduct single-plant activity and single-product multi­
plant activity, the forces of the market will lead the industry along efficient 
configurations. Following Result 2, cost substitutability results in lower levels 
of social welfare. Therefore, if efficiencies due to subadditivity of fixed costs off­
set inefficiencies due to cost substitutability, multiproduct activity is profitable, 
but leads to lower levels of social welfare. In that case, the forces of the market 
guarantee high levels of efficiency but not high levels of social welfare.
I compare now the profits of a multiproduct firm to the profits of any 
one of its single-product rivals. Multiproduct activity is profitable as long 




























































































firm in any of the two markets. I assume that the fixed costs of a single­
product manufacturer of product 1 are equal to the fixed costs of a single­
product manufacturer of product 2. Prom equations (19) and (20) I obtain the 
condition for which Ht > IIn.
Result 3 In an industry whose structure is given by S  = (k, i/), multiproduct 
activity is more profitable than single product activity if
[(V2 -  1 )M -  P{V2(1 4- v) + k)][(V2 4- 1 )M -  P{s/2{\ +  v) -  «)]
{1 + K + u)2
where F = F\ =  F .̂
> F\2 — F 
( 21)
I impose further assumptions on the parameters of the model to discuss 
an interesting implication of Result 3. I eliminate subadditivity of fixed costs, 
assuming F  =  Fu- Due to inequality (21), multiproduct activity is more prof­
itable than single-product activity if
P < 0 and \/2(l + v) > k
or if P > 0 and \/2(l + v) > k, hold simultaneously with
( V 2 - 1 ) M  ;
\/2(l 4* jy) + k,
and
(\/2 + l )M ;
\/2(l +  v) — K
Note that
( y /2 - 1  )M (x/2 + 1 )M




Then, inequalities (22) and (23) hold simultaneously for all positive values 
of the parameter P for which inequality (22) holds. In that case, multiproduct 
activity is more profitable, although the joint production of cost substitutes is 
not only socially undesirable, but also inefficient.
I have eliminated the possibility of economies of scope due to subadditivity 
of fixed costs. In this way, the range of diseconomies of scope, under which 
multiproduct activity is profitable, is expressed in a range of positive values of 
the parameter P (the range given by inequality (22)). I have shown that in 
this range of values of the parameter P, multiproduct firms earn higher profits 
than single-product firms, although multiproduct activity is inefficient and leads 




























































































inequality (22) is broader for small numbers of firms in the industry and for 
high values of the parameter M.
This consequence of Result 3 holds under a number of restrictive assump­
tions. Table 1 presents similar results that were obtained from simulations 
with symmetric and asymmetric industry configurations. Multiproduct activity 
can be more profitable even in asymmetric industry configurations and in the 
presence of cost substitutability between the two products. A multiproduct firm 
earns higher profits than any of its single-product rivals unless the degree of 
substitutability between the two products is very high.8 An interesting impli­
cation of the comparison between configurations S  =  (1, 2,3) and S  =  (2,2, 2) 
is that a single-product firm in market 2 in S  =  (1,2,3) would be willing to 
enter into market 1 if it possessed the know-how for the production of the first 
product, unless f3 were too high.9 Furthermore, a potentially multiproduct firm 
would prefer single-product activity only if (3 were too high.10
Therefore, configurations that contain more multiproduct firms may be 
internally stable even in the presence of inefficiencies of joint production. The 
forces of the market do not guarantee efficient industry configurations, unless the 
degree of substitutability between the two products is very high. The existence 
of subadditivity of the fixed costs of multiproduct firms, as compared to the 
sum of fixed costs of stand-alone production, would result in an even broader 
range of cost substitutability under which potentially multiproduct firms would 
prefer multiproduct activity than participation in only one of the two markets.
3 M ultiproduct Industries and L ong-R un  
Equilibrium  Industry Configurations
In this section I extend the definition of the long-run equilibrium number of 
firms to its multiproduct analogous, the long-run equilibrium industry configu­
ration (LREC).
An industry configuration S  = (k,A, p) is a long-run equilibrium 
configuration (LREC) of a multiproduct industry if the numbers /c,
A and p are such that all firms in the industry earn zero profits.
8With the parameter values assumed in the simulations presented in Table 1, multiproduct 
firms earn higher profits than any of their single-product rivals for all 0 < 10.
9In the example of Table 1 if 0  =  10. Note that for all other values of 0  multiproduct 
activity is more profitable. Compare for example 441 (which are the profits of a single-product 
firm in market 2 in S  = (1,2,3), if 0  = 5) with 578 (which are the profits that the firm would 
earn if it entered into market 1).
10Compare the profits of a multiproduct firm in S  =  (2,2,2) with the profits of a single­





























































































Short-run equilibrium quantities and profits
S  = (1,2,3)
0 Xi *2 Vi 3/2 Q i Q 2 nfc n, nm
0 25.00 20.00 25.00 20.00 75.00 80.00 1025 625 400
0.1 24.92 19.92 25.02 20.02 74.95 79.98 1018 626 401
1 24.25 19.20 25.25 20.20 74.75 79.80 957 637 408
5 21.25 16.00 26.25 21.00 73.75 79.00 709 689 441
10 17.50 12.00 27.50 22.00 72.50 78.00 455 756 484
S — (2,2,2)
0 Xi x2 Vi 3/2 Q i Qi n* n, nm
0 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 800 400 400
0.1 19.94 19.94 20.04 20.04 79.96 79.96 795 401 401
1 19.40 19.40 20.40 20.40 79.60 79.60 752 416 416
5 17.00 17.00 22.00 22.00 78.00 78.00 578 484 484
10 14.00 14.00 24.00 24.00 76.00 76.00 392 576 576
M  =  100, F 12 =  Fi = F2 = 0
I apply the results obtained in the previous section to study the properties 
of the long-run equilibrium of a multiproduct industry. I assume that a long- 
run equilibrium configuration is reached after a number of firms enter into the 
industry. Positive profits to a certain type of firms cause the number of firms 
of this type to increase. Negative profits to a ceratin type of firms cause the 
number of firms of this type to decrease.
I deal with the integer problem in two different ways. First, fractions of 
firms are permitted. In Baumol et al. (1982) this assumption is used to study the 
existence and structure of multiproduct competitive equilibria. The assumption 
becomes more plausible for large number of firms and in the case of industries 
in which firms are free to enter into the market at a smaller scale than the equi­
librium output in a Cournot oligopoly. Unique or multiple long-run equilibria 
are obtained, depending on the degree of substitutability or complementarity 
between the two products and on the extent to which fixed costs of joint pro­
duction are subadditive to the sum of fixed costs of ‘stand alone’ production. 
Then, I permit only an integer number of firms of each type. The definition of 
a long-run equilibrium industry configuration becomes slightly different.
An industry configuration So = (/to, Ao, Mo) is a long-run equilibrium 
configuration of a multiproduct industry, if the integer numbers kq, 
Ao and Mo are such that all firms in the industry earn non-negative 





























































































This alternative approach to the long-run equilibrium industry configura­
tion is more appropriate for small number of firms and industries in which firms 
are bound to enter at an indivisible scale of production which is equal to the 
equilibrium quantity of a Cournot oligopoly. The main implication is that firms 
earn positive profits in the long run. I find that there are broader conditions, 
compared with the case of fractional long-run equilibrium, under which there 
are multiple equilibria.
3.1 Fractional L ong-R un  Equilibrium  Industry Config­
urations
I assume that the fixed costs of single-product firms are such that iq =  iq = 
F. Following this assumption, a long-run equilibrium industry configuration 
contains equal numbers of single-product firms in each market.11
In the long run, firms will enter into the industry until the profit of each 
type of firm is zero. From equations (19) and (20) this holds if
nn
M + 0ic \ 2
1  +  K  +  V )
— F  = 0 (25)
and
lb  =  2
M - 0 ( l  + v)V
1 + fv + J/ ) - F u  =  0 (26)
From equation (25) I get
= (27)
where M  > F, in order for the number of single-product firms to be non­
negative and (3 < F, so that a simultaneous increase in the number of multi­
product and single-product firms cannot be sustained in the long run. Further­
more, equation (27) gives us the upper bound on k, implied by the requirement 





Substitution of v from (27) into (26) gives
2{y/F -  =  Fa  (28)





























































































Equation (28) is independent of the number of multiproduct firms k. Then 
I reach the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the parameters F1 2 , F and (3 are such that (28) holds, all 
industry configurations S  =  (n,v), for k > 0 and v > 0, for which equation 
(27) holds, are long-run equilibrium industry configurations.
Equation (27) has an infinite number of solutions. Therefore, if (28) holds, 
there is an infinite number of long-run equilibrium configurations of the indus­
try. A straightforward implication of proposition 2, and especially equation (27) 
is the following result:
Result 4 In a multiproduct industry which has reached a LREC an increase 
(decrease) in the number of multiproduct firms can lead to another LREC only 
if it is followed by a decrease (increase) in the number of single-product firms.
Equation (28) implies that if the fixed costs of joint production are subad­
ditive to the sum of the fixed costs of ‘stand alone’ production multiple equilib­
ria result only in the presence of cost substitutability. Therefore, multiproduct 
firms co-exist in the long run with single-product firms, if multiproduct activ­
ity leads to efficiency losses from cost substitutability and efficiency gains from 
subadditivity of fixed costs. In proposition 1, I obtained a similar result for the 
short run. The configurations given by equation (27) are equally possible to sus­
tain in the long run. However, configurations that contain more manufacturers 
of cost substitutes lead to lower levels of social welfare (see Result 2).
Equation (28) holds also in the absence of production relation between the 
two products and if the fixed costs of joint production are equal to the sum of 
fixed costs of the ‘stand alone’ production. In that case, the different long-run 
equilibria result in identical levels of efficiency and social welfare (see Result 2).
In the general case, equation (28) does not hold. Then, the expression 
holds as an inequality. If
2(VF -  P f  > F12 (29)
the profits of a multiproduct firm are always positive for all industry config­
urations in which single-product firms earn zero profits. Then the entry of a 
multiproduct firms is always profitable. For equation (27) to hold, an increase 
in the number of multiproduct firms is followed by a decrease in the numbers of 
single-product firms. The unique equilibrium industry configurations contains 





























































































Proposition 3 If inequality (29) holds, the long-run equilibrium configuration 
is S  = (k, 0), where
v/2(M -  0) ,
Alternatively, the expression given by (28) holds as an inequality in the 
opposite direction.
2(VF -  p f  < Fa  (30)
Then the profits of a multiproduct firm are always negative for all industry 
configurations in which each single-product firm earns zero profits. All multi­
product firms exit from the industry and the long-run equilibrium configuration 
contains only single-product firms. I set k = 0. From equation (27) I obtain 
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If inequality (30) holds, the long-run equilibrium configuration 
is S  = (0, v), where
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that if there is a unique long-run equilibrium 
configuration high (low) fixed costs result in a low (high) number of firms. This 
follows the standard result obtained from the single-product approach. Propo­
sition 3 shows that a unique long-run equilibrium configuration which consists 
of multiproduct firms contains less firms the higher the degree of production 
substitutability between the two products is. Therefore, the negative short- 
run effect of cost substitutability on equilibrium outputs, affects negatively the 
long-run number of multiproduct firms. Note that in the absence of multiprod­
uct firms, the degree of production substitutability or complementarity does 
not affect the number of single-product firms.
Propositions 3 and 4 give us the conditions under which there is a unique 
symmetric long-run equilibrium industry configuration. In the presence of global 
economies of scope, the long-run equilibrium configuration contains only mul­
tiproduct firms, whereas in the presence of global diseconomies of scope the 
long-run industry configuration contains only single-product firms. Given that 
equation (28) is not satisfied under subadditivity of fixed costs and cost comple­
mentarity, multiple mixed equilibria are obtained only in the presence of local 
economies of scope, or in the absence of any economies or diseconomies of joint 
production. Proposition 3 indicates that if the fixed costs of joint production 
are sufficiently lower than the sum of the fixed costs of 'stand alone' produc­
tion of the two products, the long-run equilibrium configuration contains only 




























































































and sustainable in the long run. However, efficiency results from subadditivity 
of fixed costs. In the absence of fixed costs the long-run equilibrium configura­
tion would contain only single-product firms and would result in higher levels 
of social welfare. Consider the case in which (5 > 0. Compare S\ = (k , 0) and 
S2 = (0, k) where n is the number of firms given by proposition 3. The industry 
configuration S2 leads to higher levels of social welfare than Si. However, if 
inequality (29) holds, Si is the unique long-run equilibrium configuration. In 
that case, the long-run equilibrium configuration is a suboptimal outcome in 
terms of social welfare.
3.2 L on g-R u n  Equilibrium  C onfigurations w ith  Integer  
N um bers o f Firm s
If the number of firms is small or the entry of a firm is possible only at a scale of 
production which is indivisible, the assumption of ‘fractions of firms’ becomes 
less plausible. An industry configuration So — {ko, vo), where k0 and v0 are 
positive integer numbers, is a long-run equilibrium configuration, if each type 
of firm in it earns non-negative profits and the entry of any type of firm into 
the industry yields negative profits.
If k0 and u0 are integer numbers, the conditions for So = (ko> ^o) to be a 
long-run equilibrium industry configuration become
nn M + Pk0 Ÿ  1 + /to + vo / — F = T (31)
and
n* = 2 M — 0(1 + vq) 
1 +  /to +  *4)
F  12 —  Tl2 (32)
where r  > 0, and r i2 > 0 give the net profits of each type of firm in the long run. 
If the fractional long-run equilibrium coincides with the long-run equilibrium 
with integer numbers, firms earn zero net profits. In the general case, in a 
long-run equilibrium configuration S = (acojJ'o), each multiproduct firm earns 
positive net profits given by ri2 and each single-product firm earns r. It must 
hold that
r  < n f =('co’,'o) -  n f =(,t0'l'0+1) (33)
and
_  ^  T-rS—(ko.^O)Tl2 < iljfc n5=(/co+1,k>) (34)
If one of (33), and (34) is not satisfied, then the entry of a certain type of 
firm is sustainable. In that case, S = (no, v0) would not be a long-run equilib­
































































































t < t(M + 0ko)2
T12 < 2f(M — 0( 1 + i/0))2 
3 + 2kq 4- 21/0
(1 +  Ko +  l'o)2(2 +  Ko +  ^o)2
(36)
(37)
From equation (31) I obtain the condition that has to be satisfied by a 
long-run equilibrium configuration with integer numbers of firms:
vo
M
y fT - - i - ( i -
P
y/F + T )« 0
(38)
where M  > y/F + r, in order for the number of single-product firms to be 
non-negative and 0 < y/F + t , so that a simultaneous increase in the number. 





denotes the upper bound on k implied by the requirement that the number of 
single-product firms is nonnegative.
Substitution of i/0 from (38) into (32) gives
2(y/F + t -  0)2 = F12 + T12 (39)
which is similar to the condition given by (28) for the ‘fractional’ long-run 
equilibrium. According to (33) and (34), r12, and r  are bounded by quantities 
which are decreasing functions of Ko and i/o- Therefore, the condition given by 
(39), unlike (28), depends on the number of firms.
Long-run equilibrium configurations should satisfy simultaneously (38) 
and (39). Then, I get the following proposition:
P roposition  5 The set of industry configurations ff =  {5i, S2, ...5n} with in­
teger numbers of firms is the set of long-run equilibrium configurations, if all 
configurations in it satisfy (38) and (39).
If there is more than one industry configuration for which (39) holds, then 
we have multiple mixed equilibria. Each one of them contains multiproduct 
and single-product firms. Any of the multiple mixed long-run equilibria can 





























































































Result 5 I f  2F > F)2, 0 > 0 and the industry configuration S  = (k0, vo) is a 
mixed long-run equilibrium configuration, then 2r  < Ti2 implies a lower critical 
level of subadditivity of fixed costs, beyond which multiproduct firms exist in the 
presence of cost substitutability.
Result 5 is obtained directly from propositions 1 and 5 and indicates 
that inefficient and socially undesirable industry configuration can be sustained 
in the long run. Following result 2, configurations with more multiproduct 
firms are socially desirable in the presence of cost complementarity and socially 
undesirable in the presence of cost substitutability. The intuitive interpretation 
of proposition 5 and result 5 is that if only integer number of firms are permitted, 
there is a broader range of conditions, as compared to the case of ‘fractional’ 
equilibrium, under which mixed equilibria exist. Suboptimal outcomes with 
respect to efficiency and social welfare can be sustained in the long run.
If no industry configuration satisfies (39), then the expression in (39) holds 
as an inequality.
Proposition 6 If for all industry configurations it is true that
2(VF + T  -  0)2 > F\2 + T12 (40)
there is a unique long-run equilibrium configuration S  =  (koi 0) where Ko is the 
integer part of
y/2 (M -  0) ,
Proposition 7 I f for all industry configurations it is true that
2( y / F  +  t  —  P ) 2 < Fi2 +  t \2  (41)
there is a unique long-run equilibrium configuration S = (0, u0) where uo is the 
integer part of
The last two propositions follow directly from propositions 3 and 4.
We have seen that the long-run equilibrium configuration may contain 
multiproduct and single-product firms. ‘Fractional’ long equilibrium results in 
efficient industry configurations, but not necessarily optimal outcomes in terms 
of social welfare. Multiple and mixed long-run equilibria are obtained under a 
broader range of conditions if the industry configurations are assumed to contain 
integer numbers of firms. The outcome may be inefficient and suboptimal in 






























































































So *1,0 *2,0 2/1,0 */2,0 Qi.o Q2.0 n*0 ILo rimO
(0, 5, 6) 16.16 13.78 16.66 14.28 83.33 85.71 451 277 204
(1,4, 5) 16.25 13.85 16.75 14.35 83.25 85.64 456 280 206
(2, 3, 4) 16.33 13.92 16.83 14.42 83.16 85.57 460 283 208
(3, 2, 3) 16.41 14.00 16.91 14.50 83.08 85.50 465 286 210
(4, 1, 2) 16.50 14.07 17.00 14.57 83.00 85.42 470 289 212
(5, 0, 1) 16.58 14.14 - 14.64 82.91 85.32 475 - 214
0 =  0.5, M  = 100, Fn  =  400, Fi = 250, F2 = 200 
Note that profits are not net of fixed costs.
Table 2 presents the results of simulations obtained under the assumption 
that F\ =£■ F2. Asymmetric long-run equilibrium industry configurations contain 
more single-product firms of the type that operates with lower fixed costs.
All configurations presented in Table 2 satisfy the necessary condition 
for a long-run equilibrium configuration. That is, firms in each configuration 
earn nonnegative net profits, while a potential entrant of any of the three types 
would earn negative profits. Note that internal industry dynamics may still take 
place and lead from one LREC to another. Result 4 indicates that increases 
in the number of multiproduct firms are sustainable in the long run if they are 
followed by decreases in the numbers of single-product firms. An interesting 
implication of this result is that after an industry has reached equilibrium, 
industry dynamics may still occur and lead the industry along different long- 
run equilibria. The policy-maker can use this rule to restructure the industry 
without causing firms’ profits to fall below the critical level of survival. A special 
case of industry dynamics that increases the number of multiproduct firms and 
decreases the number of multiproduct firms is an inter-market merger. An 
inter-market merger is a merger of two single-product firms from two different 
markets into a multiproduct firm.12 A split-up of a multiproduct firm into 
two single-product firms has the opposite effect on the number of firms: the 
number of multiproduct firms decreases and the number of single-product firms 
increases.13
12In Georgantzis (1992), special attention is given to the effect of inter-market mergers on 
potential competition.
13Note that in the example of Table 2 such dynamics can move the industry from one 
of the long-run equilibrium configurations to another. In this case, intermarket mergers are 
profitable for the merging firms although production becomes less efficient and total output 
falls.
Note also that the industry configuration S = (6,0,0) satisfies the necessary condition 
for a long-run equilibrium configuration, but is internally unstable, given that a potentially 
multiproduct firm in it earns higher long-run profits from single-product activity in market 





























































































I have studied the effect of production complementarity and substitutability, 
on the equilibria in two markets which are served by a number of multiproduct 
firms and a number of single-product firms in each market. Production com­
plementarity gives a technological advantage to a multiproduct manufacturer, 
while the opposite is true for production substitutability. Production substi­
tutability has a negative effect on output levels. Therefore, joint production 
of cost substitutes has a negative impact on social welfare. In the presence of 
cost substitutability, savings due to subadditivity of fixed costs of multiproduct 
firms as compared to the sum of the fixed costs of ‘stand-alone’ production, 
makes multiproduct activity profitable but not socially desirable.
Production complementarity or substitutability and subadditivity of fixed 
costs determine the industry structure in the long run. Multiple mixed equilibria 
result under a broader range of conditions, if the industry configurations are 
assumed to contain integer numbers of firms than if ‘fractions’ of firms are 
permitted. ‘Fractional’ equilibria guarantee efficiency but not optimality in 
terms of consumer welfare. If industry configurations are assumed to consist of 
integer numbers of firms, socially suboptimal and inefficient outcomes can be 
sustained in the long run.
In the case of multiple long-run equilibrium configurations, ‘moving’ from 
one of them to another implies that increases in the number of multiproduct 
firms are followed by decreases in the number of single-product firms and vice 
versa. The implication of this observation is that the merger of two single­
product manufacturers into a multiproduct firm may prove a useful tool for re­
structuring a multiproduct industry without affecting significantly incumbents’ 
long-run profits.
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